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Growth in Thailand 
Narongchai Akrasanee 
Introduction 
In the past two decades, Thailand has had one of  the more rapidly grow- 
ing economies  in Southeast Asia.l  Since 1960, gross domestic product 
(GDP) has increased at an annual rate of  about 7 percent. Manufactur- 
ing activity has become more important in this period; its share of  GDP 
rose from  13 to  18 percent while manufacturing employment increased 
from 3.4 to 8.3 percent of  total employment between  1960 and  1976. 
Nonetheless,  the  economy  remains  principally  dependent  upon  the 
primary  sector:  agriculture absorbs 79 percent  of  the labor force and 
generates about one-third  of  GDP. 
The rapid  growth  of  the manufacturing  sector can be  attributed  in 
part to Thailand’s promotion of  import substitution activities. However, 
its policies have not been overly restrictive. Tariff protection is relatively 
moderate,  quantitative  restrictions  are not  extensively  used,  and  the 
currency  has  been  only  slightly overvalued.  In recent  years,  policies 
have shifted to place more emphasis upon promoting exports. 
This study has the important objective of  analyzing the relationship 
between  trade  policies  and employment  growth  in Thailand.  Employ- 
ment  creation  is  a  pressing  problem.  The country  has  relatively  high 
growth rates of  total population  (3 percent annually) and urban popu- 
lation  (5 percent); urban unemployment is close to 10 percent, accord- 
ing to official figures. Thus, in spite of  impressive gains in manufactur- 
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ing output and employment, it is important to determine if  Thailand’s 
import substitution policies have been able to generate as much employ- 
ment as alternative (export promotion) policies might have done. 
This analysis centers upon 1973, primarily because of  data availability. 
The year 1973 falls into the period when policies were shifting to place 
more  emphasis upon  exports. However,  not  all  aspects of  the  export 
promotion scheme had then occurred (e.g., there was a change in tariff 
rates in  1974). The data should therefore be broadly representative of 
the latter phase of  the import substitution period. 
9.1  Major Characteristics of  Thailand’s Economy 
9.1.1  Growth and Structure 
Thailand is a relatively prosperous developing country. In 1976 its 
per capita GNP was baht  7,541, or about U.S. $370 at that year’s ex- 
change rate  (baht 20.4 per U.S. $1). Real GDP growth from  1972 to 
1976 averaged 6.6 percent annually, down slightly from the 7.1 percent 
rate in the period 1960 to 1972 (see table 9.1 ) .  This rapid growth was 
due mainly to a relatively high rate of  fixed capital formation, which 
increased as a percentage of  GDP from  14.9 in  1960 to 21.0 in  1972 
and 23.5 in 1976. 
Primary-sector activities  (agriculture, mining, and quarrying) domi- 
nate Thailand’s economy, although their importance has fallen over time. 
In 1976 they accounted for 31 percent of  GDP, compared with 40 per- 
cent in 1960. In the first half of  the 1970s, primary sector exports, some 
raw and some in semiprocessed form  (SITC sections 0-4),2  generated 
about 80 percent of  total exports. The most important were rice, maize, 
rubber, tin, tapioca products, and sugar. 
The importance of  manufacturing activities has increased rapidly since 
1960. As I mentioned above, its shares in GDP and total employment 
rose from 13 and 3.4 percent to 18 and 8.3 percent, respectively, from 
1960 to 1976. The bulk of  manufacturing output is produced by import 
substitution industries. However, the  recent  emphasis upon  manufac- 
tured  exports  (see discussion, section 9.1.2)  has  had  some effect. In 
1976 they  were  either  17 or 37 percent of  total  exports  (depending 
upon whether an SITC or an ISIC classification is used  to categorize 
activities)  .3 
9.1.2  International Trade 
The Pattern and Composition of Trade 
Thailand is heavily dependent upon trade. Together exports and im- 
ports averaged about 36 percent of  GDP in  1972-76.  Its trading part- 395  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
Table 9.1  Some Salient Features of  the Thai Economy 
1960  1972  1976 
Population  (million)  27 
Annual growth rate (percentage) 
GNP per  capita  (baht, current prices)  2,056 
GNP per capita  (baht, 1962 prices)  2,198 
GDP (million baht, current prices)  55,8 16 
GDP (million baht, 1962 prices)  59,400 
Annual  growth rate  (percentage) 
Gross fixed capital formation as 
percentage of  GDP  14.9 
Primary value added as percentage of 
GDP  40.2 
Manufacturing value added as 
percentage of  GDP (ISIC 3)  13.1 
Utilities, construction, services, etc., 
as percentage  of  GDP  46.7 
Imports as percentage of GDP  17.2 
Manufacturing  imports  (SITC 5-8)  as 
percentage of  total imports  74.6 
Exports as percentage of  GDP  15.4 
Manufacturing  exports (SITC 5-8  less 
tin") as percentage of  total exports  1.4 
Manufacturing exports  (ISIC 3) as 
percentage" of  total exports  n.a. 
Manufacturing employment as percentage 
Share of  manufacturing  output in the 
of total employment  3.4 





































Sources:  National Economic  and Social Development  Board  (NESDB)  and the 
Bank of  Thailand (1976). 
nSee notes  2  and  3 for the  differences  in  manufacturing  definitions  in  ISIC and 
ISTC codes. 
"There are four regions  in the country: Central, North, South, and Northeast. The 
Bangkok metropolis is in the Central region. 
ners, especially as a source for imports, are developed countries. About 
60 to 70 percent of  its imports and 50 percent of  its exports originated 
in or were destined for developed nations in the 1970s. Member coun- 
tries  of  the Association  of  Southeast Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) took 
about 20 percent of  Thai exports but accounted for a very small share 
of  Thai imports. 
As I  mentioned  above,  most  exports  are NRB  goods  or processed 
NRB goods. Only 17 percent of  exports in 1976 are classified as manu- 
factured  under  the  SITC  nomenclature  (SITC  5-8).  However,  this 
represents a dramatic increase over the 1.4 percent value in 1960. Most 396  Narongchai Akrasanee 
manufactured  exports go to developed  countries. Data on some major 
HOS exportables are given in table 9.2. 
On the other hand, imports consist primarily of  manufactured goods, 
although their share in total imports fell from 74 to 64 percent  from 
1972 to 1976 owing to the higher prices of  crude oil. The composition 
of  imports has changed markedly since 1960, when consumer goods con- 
stituted 32 percent of  imports and when intermediate products  (includ- 
ing raw materials)  and capital goods accounted for 18 percent and 27 
percent,  re~pectively.~  The proportion  of  consumer  goods imports has 
declined continuously since then. It was 13  percent in 1977, with most of 
the reduction taking place in nondurable consumer goods. In the mean- 
time, the shares of  intermediate products and capital goods imports have 
increased, reaching  25 percent  and 35 percent,  respectively,  in  1976. 
These changes reflect the import substitution bias of  the trade regime. 
The rapid  growth  in  the domestic  production  of  consumer  goods has 
entailed increased imports of  intermediate products  and capital goods. 
Data on imports of  the main import-competing industries  are given in 
table 9.3. 
The Trade Regime 
Since  World  War  11,  Thailand’s  trade  policies  have  evolved  from 
being very restrictive to being fairly liberaL6 In the 1960s they empha- 
sized  import  substitution  industries;  only  recently  have  exports  been 
promoted in a systematic fashion. In general, though, Thailand has not 
had  a  clear-cut  trade  policy.  Responsibility  for trade matters  extends 
over a wide range of  ministries and therefore there has been no specific 
objective except to earn income through exports, to meet development 
Table 9.2  Characteristics of  Major Exportable Industries 
Product 
Factor 
Exports, 1973  Intensities 
Workers per 
Developed  Developing  Million Baht 
Countries  Countries  Total  of  DVA 
(Thousands of  Baht) 
Sugar  250.7  1,214.0  1,464.7  18.1 
Shaved wood  383.8  76.3  460.1  25.5 
Leather  51.0  53.1  104.1  80.2 
Wood manufactures  246.5  9.8  256.3  23.4 
Textiles  846.7  399.0  1,245.7  29.4 
Clothing  683.0  13.4  696.4  72.3 
Sources:  For exports, U.N. Statistics of  Foreign Trade, Thailand,  1973; for factor 
intensities. table 9.1 2. 397  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
Table 9.3  Characteristics of  Thailand’s Main Import-Competing Industries 
Factor 
Imports  Intensities 
(Thousands of  Baht) 
Workers per 
Developed  Developing  Million Baht 
Product  Countries  Countries  Total  of  DVA 
Dairy products  517.0 
Chemical materials  2,014.9 
Pharmaceuticals  833.4 
Chemical products  1,556.9 
Rubber tires and tubes  54.9 
Paper and paperboard  544.7 
Metal manufactures  942.4 
Radio, television, 
and household 
appliances  632.3 
Passenger cars  1,041.8 
Buses and trucks  99.0 
Motorcycles and 
nonmotorized road 


































Sources: For imports, U.N. Statistics of  Foreign Trade, Thailand, 1973; for factor 
intensities, table 9.12. 
requirements  through  imports,  and  to  generate  tax  revenue  (import 
duties form about 25 percent of  government revenue). 
Subject to these provisos concerning the lack of  a clear policy focus, 
we  can identify  four phases of  varying degrees of  trade restrictiveness 
since World War 11.  The first period  (1944-55)  was the only one with 
very  restrictive  trade  and exchange  controls, particularly  in  rice  trade 
(Corden 1967). Licenses were required for exports and imports, and all 
export  proceeds  had to be  sold  to-and  foreign  exchange to pay  for 
imports bought from-the  Bank of  Thailand at the official rate. Foreign 
exchange controls were replaced by  a multiple exchange rate system in 
1947 (Yang 1957; Marzouk  1972), and trade controls were gradually 
relaxed through the period. In 1955, after an improvement in the balance 
of  trade, the multiple exchange rate system was abolished and trade was 
liberalized. 
The  end  of  trade  control  and  the  multiple  exchange  rate  system 
marked the beginning of  a liberal phase in trade policy (  1955-61 ) . The 
only significant measure retained from the previous period was the tax- 
ation of  rice exports. The government did not interfere in trade, though 
it  was  involved  in  the  establishment  of  public  industrial  enterprises. 398  Narongchai Akrasanee 
When Field Marshall Sarit came to power in 1957, the policy of  direct 
government participation in industrial production was also dropped. NO 
more industrial state enterprises were created, and some of  the existing 
ones were leased to the private sector. The government, with assistance 
from the World  Bank,  designed a new  strategy  for economic develop- 
ment, which later became the first National  Economic  and Social De- 
velopment  Plan. 
The First Six-Year Plan, inaugurated in 1961 and implemented by the 
newly established National Economic Development Board, marked the 
beginning of  the import substitution phase  (1961-71).  This plan  and 
the ensuing one covering 1967-71  essentially dealt with sector program- 
ming, the organization of  government revenue, the planning of  govern- 
ment  expenditures  on  infrastructure,  and  project  evaluation  over  a 
longer  period  of  time  (National  Economic  and  Social  Development 
Board 1963, 1968).6 
The plans imposed no general policy restrictions or guidelines on for- 
eign trade, implying that imports  were  allowed  and exports  were not 
actively encouraged. However, they directly affected trade through their 
encouragement of  industrial  development, which was to be left to the 
private sector. This encouragement took the form of  protecting domestic 
production that competed with imports and was reflected in the system 
of  taxation  of  foreign  trade and tax  exemptions  for domestic produc- 
tion, and in the promotion of  industrial investment under various invest- 
ment promotion  acts.? While the structure of  taxes provided  a certain 
degree of  protection, most incentives to domestic production were found 
in various provisions  (tax exemption, etc.)  in these promotion acts. To- 
ward the end of  the period these investment incentives were reduced, but 
tariff protection was increased.8 The government also used a number of 
other  measures  to help  import  substitution industries. These included 
industrial controls  (which regulated entry and expansion), import  and 
export  controls,  and  credit  assistance.  Throughout the period, exports 
were discouraged or neglected.  Some primary exports were taxed, and 
there was no effective promotion scheme for manufactured exports. 
After  1971  the  trade  regime  began  to promote  exports,  especially 
manufactured goods, while simultaneously  continuing to encourage im- 
port substitutes. This policy increased tariff protection through a revision 
of the tariff schedule in 1970, which was actually intended to correct the 
deficit in the balance of  payments. Then in  1972 the Investment Pro- 
motion Act was revised to include incentives for manufactured exports. 
In addition, the Export Promotion Act  (1972)  provided  a number of 
other measures to encourage  export^.^ In the meantime there was more 
frequent resort  to direct  controls  on trade,  industry,  and  prices.  The 
outcome of  all these changes was a reduction in the bias against exports. 
In addition to the promotion  of  manufactured exports, the new Invest- 399  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
ment  Promotion  Act  was  aimed  at stimulating  employment.  That is, 
priority in promotion was to be given to firms that would create a large 
amount of  employment. 
In summary, there were three areas of  policy that affected domestic 
sales and exports sales during the 1972-76  period:  taxation  and  sub- 
sidization, promotion of  industry and exports, and restrictions and con- 
trols on trade and industry.  All three are discussed in greater detail in 
section 9.2. 
Balance of Payments 
Since World  War 11,  Thailand has almost continuously  experienced 
relatively large current account deficits, offset to a major degree by large 
capital inflows, mainly direct investment inflows (see table 9.4). Changes 
in current account balances have often caused adjustments in trade poli- 
cies. For example, as I mentioned above, the loosening of  trade controls 
in  1955 was a direct result of  an improvement in the current account. 
Similarly,  the shift to the simultaneous encouragement of  exports and 
import substitutes after  1971 was due, in part, to worsening merchan- 
dise balance  (from  1965 to  1970, the merchandise balance fell from 
-U.S.  $117 million to -U.S.  $584 million). 
Exchange Rate Policies 
Thailand has adjusted  its exchange rate only  infrequently, probably 
becaues inflation has not been  a major problem  and because the gen- 
eral consensus in Thailand is that currency overvaluation is not impor- 
tant. To correct balance  of  payment problems,  policymakers  have in- 
stead  adjusted  tariffs  or  imposed  controls.  After  the  elimination  of 
multiple  exchange  rates  in  1955, Thailand  maintained  a  rate  in  the 
neighborhood  of  baht  20.5-baht  20.8  per  United  States  dollar  until 
1974, when it was lowered slightly to baht 20.25-baht  20.45 per dollar.1° 
During this period, inflation averaged about 2-3  percent per year except 
for 1972-74,  when  it  rose to double-digit  figures.  Since  1974, prices 
have risen by about 5-6  percent annually. 
Table 9.4  Thailand’s Balance of Payments, Selected Periods 1960-74 
( Miillions of U.S. Dollars) 
Averages  Averages  Averages 
1960-64  1965-69  1970-74 
Goods and services balance  -52.4  -  126.6  -208.2 
Current account balance  -13.3  -  72.0  107.4 
Capital inflows  60.8  110.4  236.4 
Source:  International  Monetary Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various 
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The currency has been slightly overvalued. According to a study of 
the Bank of  Thailand (Wibulswadi et al. 1979), the baht was found to 
be overvalued by  17 percent in 1970-71,  7 percent in 1972, t2  percent 
in 1973, 3-6  percent in  1974-76,  and +2 percent in  1977. When ad- 
justed for purchasing power parity,  the over  (under) valuation ranged 
from 20 percent  (1970) to -9  percent  (1977). My own calculations 
using  the Bacha  and Taylor  (1971) approach, which  includes  tariffs 
and export taxes (not considered by Wibulswadi et al.), place the over- 
valuation at about 20 percent. Considering capital flows in response to 
real interest differentials, currency overvaluation is probably not signifi- 
cant relative to that found in many developing countries. 
9.1.3  The Structure of  Production 
Table 9.5 shows in detail the structure of  trade and domestic produc- 
tion of  manufactures in 1973, using the product classification followed in 
my  analysis  of  protection  and  of  factor proportions  in the following 
sections. Instead of  using value added, the value of  total output is here 
used to measure production, so that the figures can be compared directly 
with the value of  exports and imports. Products have been divided into 
seven subgroups:  processed foods, beverages and tobacco, construction 
materials, intermediate products, consumer nondurables, consumer dur- 
ables, and machinery  and transportation equipment. The column on the 
far right gives the trade classifications of  these activities. 
The bulk (56 percent) of manufacturing output is produced by import 
substitution  industries,  most  of  which  (83  percent)  are  located  in 
Bangkok.  About  40  percent  of  manufacturing  output is  produced  by 
exportable industries, and the rest (4 percent)  is produced in industries 
classified as not competing with imports. 
While  imports  consist  mainly  of  intermediate products,  machinery, 
and  transportation  equipment,  domestic  production  is  more  widely 
spread over all product categories. Since we are using gross value here, 
not value added, it should be noted that the concentration in the value 
of  some products  may be due to the high value of  their inputs.  If  we 
were  using value added, we would  see larger  shares of  domestic pro- 
duction in beverages and tobacco, processed food, and construction ma- 
terials and a smaller share in machinery and transportation equipment. 
About 50 percent of  production  of  importable activities consisted of 
processed foods, beverages, and consumer goods in 1973; the remainder 
was roughly evenly divided between intermediate and capital goods pro- 
duction. Those activities that faced  greater import competition  belong 
largely to the intermediate products and consumer nondurable groups. 
Some of  these products are rubber tires and tubes, glass products, yarn 
and thread, chemical products, chemical materials, paper products, plas- 
tic materials  and products,  metal products,  pharmaceuticals,  and foot- Table 9.5  Domestic Production,  Imports and Exports  of  Manufactures, 1973 (Million Baht and Percentage) 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Trade 
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Chemical materials 
Leather 
Yarn and thread 
Cordage and rope 
Glass products 

























































































2.3  1,621 
1.8  41 
0.5  14 
-  397 
-  1,161 
4 
3 
0.1  19 
0.1  10 
9 
0.4  351 
0.1  336 
- 
- 
-  - 
- 
0.3  15 
46.2  6,978 
0.3  644 
-  31 
7.6  56 
-  105 
2.4  161 
0.2  96 
0.2  3 
13.7  135 
15.3  - 
0.4  M 
0.1  M 
3.8  X 
11.0  X 
-  M 
-  X 
0.2 
-  X 
0.1  M 
0.1  M 
3.3  - 
3.2  X 
- 
0.1  M 
66.0  - 
6.1  X 
0.3  X 
0.5  M 
1  .o  M 
1.5  M 
0.9  X 
-  M 
1.3  NC Table 9.5-continued 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Trade 




Materials of  rubbera 
Articles of  rubber 
Rubber tires and tubes 
Wood manufactures 







Essential oils, perfume, 
and toiletries 
Leather products 
Pottery and china 

































































































3.7  11 
8.7  91 
0.5  48 
0.4  4,578 
0.4  19 
0.2  22 
0.1  259 
2.1  29 
0.4  30 
1.2  507 
0.2  42 
3.8  112 
7.8  1,411 
3.3  64 
1.2  18 
-  105 
4 
0.5  7 




2.2  202 
0.4  302 














































M Table 9.5-continued 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Trade 
Product  SITC  Output  of Total  Imports  of Total  Exports  of Total  Categoryb 
Consumer durables 







Electric wires, cables, 
and machinery 
Passenger car assembly 






























































47  0.5 
17  0.2 
30  0.3 
149  1.4 
68  0.6 
16  0.2 
22  0.2 
8  0.1 
5 
22  0.2 
- 
8  0.1 












Source: Exports and imports are from Customs Department, Statement of Foreign Trade of Thailand, 1973, Bangkok; Output data are from 
the NESDB. 
aThis item consists almost entirely of  processed natural rubber. It was included here because it is classified under SITC 621. 
Wode: X, exportable; M, importable; NC, noncompeting production  (see section 9.2 for a description of  the categories). 404  Narongchai Akrasanee 
wear. In other product groups there were also some import-competing 
items such as passenger cars, buses and trucks, electric wires and cables, 
and agricultural machinery  in the machinery  and transportation equip- 
ment category, and radio, television, and household  appliances in con- 
sumer durables. Products in the processed foods, beverages and tobacco, 
and construction materials groups had little import competition.  Thus 
most of  them may be considered to be  “competitive”  with imports in 
the sense that they  did not need  protection  to survive  in the market. 
Some of  these products, however, were exported to such an extent that 
they are classified as export industries. 
Manufactured exports are a recent phenomenon in Thailand. Most of 
the export products developed from being import substitution industries 
in the 1960s or earlier, and some consist of  the processing of  domestic 
primary  products  to  higher  levels  of  production.  Thus, manufactured 
exports are found in the processed  foods, construction materials, inter- 
mediate products,  and consumer nondurables groups. The more impor- 
tant manufactured exports are sugar, tapioca flour, cement, shaved wood 
and wood  products,  textile  fabrics and products  (including clothing), 
and leather products  (see table 9.2). 
9.1.4  The Labor Market 
Table 9.6 gives some data on population  and the labor force. Thai- 
land’s population growth rate is high, even for a developing country. It 
has averaged at least 3 percent annually since 1950. Reflecting this high 
rate, the fraction of  the population under fifteen years of  age has been 
rising and in 1970 stood at 45 percent. 
Population  growth at such a high rate would itself indicate the need 
for rapid  creation of  new jobs. But the situation in Thailand is further 
confounded by  the fact that the country  has  a large rural population 
(79 percent  in  1970), a  high  (5 percent)  rate  of  urban  population 
growth, and a high urban unemployment  rate (currently  placed  at 9.4 
percent in official documents). 
Thus, employment opportunities in Thailand must grow both to pro- 
vide for expansion  of  the labor force and to permit  some part of  the 
expanding  rural  population  to shift  into nonagricultural  activities.  In 
view of  these needs, Thailand’s  performance has not been satisfactory. 
Despite an annual average growth rate of  10 percent for manufacturing 
output, manufacturing employment has grown at an average annual rate 
of  only 4 percent. 
There is, unfortunately, very little reliable information on workers and 
their  characteristics;  so inferences  about  the functioning of  the labor 
market and distortions in incentives that affect the choice of  technique 
are hard to draw. The minimum wage in Thailand does not appear to 
have been  set high enough  to affect firms’ employment  decisions:  the 405  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
Table 9.6  Labor Force and Employment in Thailand, 1960-77 
Population,  Manufacturing  Total  Unemployment 
Midyear  Employment  Employment  Rate (Percent-  Manufacturing 
(Millions  (Thousands of  (Millions  age of  Labor  Real Wage 
of  Persons)  Persons)  of  Persons)  Force)  (1970 = 100) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1960  26.40  n.a.a  n.a.  0.6 
1961  27.20  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  104.1 
1962  28.05  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  92.4 
1963  28.92  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  111.9 
1964  29.82  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  127.8 
1965  30.74  n.a. 
1966  30.96  n.a. 
1967  31.79  n.a. 
1968  34.04  n.a. 
1969  35.11  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  123.9 
n.a.  n.a.  94.7 
n.a.  n.a.  92.1 
n.a.  n.a.  99.4 
n.a.  n.a.  101.2 
1970  36.4  n.a.  n.a.  1.1  100.0 
1971  37.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  121.8 
1972  38.6  1,411.4  16.06  n.a.  98.5 
1973  39.7  1,353.8  16.75  6.7  108.6 
1974  40.8  1,909.5  15.40  8.7  68.3 
1975  41.9  1,958.9  14.17  n.a.  66.3 
1976  43.0  1,514.0  18.19  5.3  72.2 
1977  44.0  n.a.  19.7  5 .I  n.a. 
Source: (1) East  Asia  and Pacific Regional Office, Thailand,  Toward  a Develop- 
ment Strategy of Full Participation: A Basic Economic Report, report no. 2059-TH, 
1 September 1978, table 1.1, p.  137. 
(2) (5) ILO. 
(3) ILO for 1972-75  and the Bank of  Thailand for 1976-77. 
(4) The same source as  (1) for  1960, 1970, and the Bank of Thailand  for 1973, 
1974, 1976, and 1977. 
%.a. =  not available. 
legal minimum has been well below the wage paid to unskilled workers 
in all industries. There do not appear to be any other significant govern- 
ment  interventions with employment  in  the private sector. Real wages 
have tended to fall in recent years (see table 9.6). However, the govern- 
ment has subsidized credit, placed  legal ceilings on interest rates,  and 
permitted  the importation  of  machinery  at  implicitly  overvalued  ex- 
change rates.  All these policies have undoubtedly  encouraged the use 
of  more capital-intensive techniques and the introduction of  more capital- 
intensive industries than would have occurred in their absence. 
Wage  data by  occupation  or other  category  are lacking  except  for 
1971 and 1973. Even for those years, few data are available. As will be 
seen in section 9.4, there are no reliable indicators of  the training, ex- 406  Narongchai  Akrasanee 
perience, and skill of  labor force members. As a consequence, sex is the 
only characteristic against which wage differentials could be examined. 
Although  wage  differentials seem  wide,  the  male/female  dichotomy 
seems highly significant, and it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
about the nature of  the labor market in Thailand without further evi- 
dence. Nonetheless, the small fraction of  the population that is now ur- 
banized, the increasing number of young persons who will enter the labor 
force, and the pressure on urban  areas all suggest that pressures will 
arise in the future, either upon the level of  real wages or on unemploy- 
ment, unless the rate at which industrial jobs are created increases. 
9.1.5  Summary 
Thailand has had an impressive record of  growth since 1960. GDP 
grew at an annual average rate of  about 7 percent, while manufactur- 
ing output grew at an even faster rate of  about 10 percent. However, the 
economy remains rural-based, with NRB production representing one- 
third of GDP and the rural population constituting 79 percent of  total 
population.  Growth  in  the  manufacturing sector  was  due  in  part  to 
policies promoting import substitutes. These policies included tariff pro- 
tection, implicit subsidization of  capital goods, and various other direct 
interventions. However, despite these high rates of  growth, employment 
creation  continues  to  be  a  major  problem.  The  rate  of  rural-urban 
migration has been high, and urban unemployment is increasing. 
9.2  The Trade Regime and the Structure of  Protection 
in the Early 1970s 
9.2.1  The Trade Regime in the Early 1970s 
Thailand has had no clear-cut focus to its trade policies. Responsi- 
bility for trade matters is scattered over a range of  agencies, and changes 
in policies are more often than not a response to changing balance of 
payments situations. 
In principle, the Ministry of  Commerce administers all foreign trade 
matters. In practice, responsibility is widely diffused. For NRB exports, 
policies are formulated under the jurisdiction of  the Ministry of  Agri- 
culture  and  Cooperatives and  the Ministry  of  Industry;  the Ministry 
of  Commerce has only partial control on rice and sugar exports through 
the rice premium and sugar export surcharge;ll export taxation is under 
the authority of  the Ministry of  Finance. For manufactured exports, both 
the Ministry of  Commerce and the Ministry of  Finance promote exports 
directly,  while  the  Bank  of  Thailand  has  a  credit  facility  to  assist 
exporting. 
For  imports,  the Ministry of  Commerce exercises  control  through 
quantitative restrictions, and the Ministry of  Finance administers control 407  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
through import duties and other forms of  taxation. But, since imports 
are mostly investment goods, their importation depends upon decisions 
to invest, which in turn depend partly upon the policy of  the Board of 
Investment. Furthermore,  the Bank of  Thailand may regulate credit to 
finance imports and, together with the Ministry of  Finance, may change 
the exchange rate. 
In the early 1970s, the three major trade policy instruments affecting 
manufacturing activities were tariffs and  domestic taxation, tax incen- 
tives, and a variety of  other measures affecting specific industries (e.g., 
price controls and legal barriers to entry). The various tariff, tax, and 
“subsidization”l2 policies of  the Ministry of  Finance appeared to have 
the  largest effect  upon  trade  in  manufactured  goods.  The next  most 
important were the various promotional activities of  the Board of  In- 
vestment  and  the  Ministry of  Finance.  Activities  of  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce, the supposed administrator of  foreign trade matters, were 
relatively  unimportant,  since its major policy  instrument  (quantitative 
restrictions) was not extensively used during the period under review.13 
The various policy instruments are discussed below. 
TarifJs  and Taxation 
The  1960 tariff  schedule, based upon the four-digit BTN  and  con- 
sisting of  1,097 items, is in use today, although rates have been changed 
to make it more escalated. Tariffs were initially imposed to raise reve- 
nue.  Hence rates  were not high  in  the early  1960s except for  a few 
luxury consumer goods. Nonetheless, they did provide some protection 
for domestic production. Throughout  the  1960s a number  of  upward 
adjustments were made, and there  were major revisions in  1964 and 
1  970.14 However, protection of  domestic production was not the main 
objective assigned to tariff policy  in Thailand.  The stated purpose of 
these  adjustments  was  to  check  the  balance  of  payments  deficit.15 
Finally, a tariff revision in 1974 responded to demands for greater tariff 
protection  after  the  reduction  in  tax  incentives under  the investment 
promotion scheme. 
Thus Thailand’s tariff structure has evolved to be more of  a protective 
device than it was in the  1960s. Although the highest rates have been 
on processed food, alcoholic beverage, and tobacco imports, these rates 
do not really reflect Thailand’s tariff policies, since domestic production 
in these industries usually does not compete with imports-that  is, do- 
mestic production is different in nature from imports. 
The escalation is seen by  analyzing the evolution of  tariff  protection 
in  other commodity groups. In  1964 rates were about  25-30  percent 
for intermediate products and  15-20  percent for machinery and trans- 
portation  equipment. In 1970 rates  for durable  and nondurable  con- 
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rates  for  intermediate  products  and  machinery  and  equipment were 
unchanged. Finally, in 1974 rates on imports of  consumer goods that did 
not compete with domestic production were cut to as little as one-tenth 
of  the old  rate.  Likewise, rates  for  a large number  of  raw  materials 
and intermediate products were reduced to one-tenth of  the old level, 
while those  for machinery and mechanical appliances, both  for  agri- 
cultural  and for industrial uses, were reduced from  15-20  percent to 
10 percent.  The rates  for  other  consumer goods remained  the  same 
(Akrasanee 1973, 1975). The net result is an escalated tariff  structure 
providing greatest protection to activities producing finished products. 
In addition to tariffs, several other taxes provide some protection. One, 
the business tax, is imposed on both imports and domestic production. 
On imports, business tax rates are a percentage of  the estimated market 
value, which is equal to the c.i.f. price plus tariff plus a (predetermined) 
standard profit rate,  and the tax is  collected by  the Customs Depart- 
ment. On domestic products the manufacturer pays the tax if  the goods 
are destined for the domestic market.lG Before 1961, business tax rates 
were very low, most items being subject to a rate of  2 percent. The gen- 
eral rate for finished products has increased gradually, rising to 5 percent 
in  1961 and to 7 percent in  1970, while the rate for raw material and 
intermediate products has remained at 1.5 percent. The rates for goods 
considered luxuries have always been high, ranging from 10 or 15 per- 
cent to 30 or 40 percent. The rates were the same for both domestically 
produced goods and imports until 1973 and had no nominal protective 
effect. In December 1973 the business tax rates on many domestically 
produced goods were reduced as a move to check inflation (Akrasanee 
1975). Those on imports remained unchanged. For example, rates on 
several items of  domestic raw materials and food fell to zero, and for 
others the rates were reduced if  they used purchased inputs. Thus the 
new business tax now has a protective effect. 
Besides the business tax,  an excise tax has been imposed  on a few 
domestic products  and  imports. Goods liable to the tax, whether do- 
mestically produced or imported, are alcoholic and nonalcoholic bever- 
ages, tobacco products, playing cards, and snuff. For these products the 
excise tax has a protective effect, since the rates on imports and those on 
domestic products differ slightly. On the other hand, domestic produc- 
tion  (and not  imports)  of  cement, petroleum products,  matches, and 
mechanical lighters is subject to the tax; in this case the tax has negative 
protective effect (Akrasanee 1975). 
Finally, Thailand’s traditional exports are subject to an export duty, 
namely  (in  1973): rice  (5 percent), rubber  (7.3  percent), logs  and 
wood  (18.7 percent), and raw hides of  bovine animals (22.3 percent). 
Other exports are not subject to export duty, but before 1973 most of 
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export tax called  “premium” has been imposed on rice  (0-30  percent, 
depending on the year)  and sugar, the latter since 1974. On the other 
hand, there have been subsidies on the export of  cement, sugar (during 
1961-66),  and, since 1972, many other manufactured products. 
Tax Incentives and Other Promotional Measures 
In 1954 the first Act on Promotion of  Industries was passed, and the 
Board of  Investment was established  to render  assistance to would-be 
entrepreneurs and investors under the provisions of  the 1954 act (Board 
of Investment  1959). This act was revised in 1962 and again in  1972. 
Encouragement  is provided through both tax and nontax incentives. In 
addition, the Board of  Investment is to coordinate policy measures un- 
der the jurisdiction of  other government  agencies that affect industrial 
incentives1‘ 
The most important provision  in the original promotion act was tax 
concessions on imported machinery, equipment, raw materials,  and in- 
termediate  inputs  needed  directly  for production. Tax concessions on 
these inputs  depended  upon  the classification of  promoted  industries. 
Initially, industries were classified into three groups according to their 
“importance” to the national economy (Silcock 1967; Akrasanee 1973). 
Group A received  full exemption  from tariffs and business taxes,  and 
groups B and C received one-half and one-third exemption, respectively. 
Toward the mid-1960s most industries under group A were reclassified 
into groups B and C, and since 1967 only group C has been left. In 1972 
tax incentives were given in relation to location and orientation.l* Firms 
granted  tax  concessions  earlier but not  meeting  the new  criteria  con- 
tinued to be entitled to them until their expiration. As these tax incen- 
tives were being phased  out, they were replaced by tariff  increases  on 
some finished products and tariff reductions on some inputs. 
Most  firms  obtaining  these  concessions  until  the early  1970s  were 
involved in import substitution production.  Export promotion measures 
were not effective despite official statements and policies to encourage 
manufactured  exports.  For example, since the late  1950s exports have 
been eligible for the partial refund of  duties and business taxes on im- 
ported inputs. Probably  the administrative fragmentation  (and lack of 
an overriding trade policy orientation) caused the ineffectiveness of this 
policy measure. 
Since  1972  manufactured  exports  have  been  actively  promoted. 
Measures used include full exemption from tariffs and business taxes on 
imported inputs, refunds of  all taxes assessed in the production process, 
discounts on short-term loans at the Bank of  Thailand, and exemption 
from business taxes on the products. These incentives are in addition to 
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Restrictions and Controls on Trade and Zndustry 
Apart from the tariffs, taxes, and concessions listed above, the gov- 
ernment intervenes through controls on prices, imports, and exports and 
through restrictions on various kinds  of  industries. Although not  ex- 
tensively used previously, these restrictions and controls have been in- 
creasing since the latter part of the  1960s. They have been used pri- 
marily to protect existing firms or else to stabilize domestic prices. 
Price controls were applied on only a few commodities before 1970- 
rice, meat, rice meal, and ice. In 1971 gunnysacks, condensed and evap- 
orated milk, gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene, and in 1972 white sugar 
were  added  to the  list.  The  export  prices of  many  commodities in- 
creased rapidly in 1973 and pulled domestic prices along with them. The 
government  accordingly  imposed  price  controls  on  cotton,  synthetic 
thread, and most types of  textiles. In 1974 price control over most tex- 
tiles was lifted, but many other kinds of  commodities were put on the 
list; among them  were monosodium glutamate, cement, vegetable oil, 
detergent, iron rods, and printing and writing paper.19 
Most of  the commodities under price control were exportables whose 
domestic prices  had  increased  as  a  result  of  an  increase in  foreign 
prices. Price control, which is usually applied to the producer as well as 
to consumer prices, is thus a measure intended to stabilize the domestic 
price level. It is not an integral part of  protection policy, but it has the 
effect of  reducing the overall level of  incentives for the products con- 
cerned. However, price control has not significantly affected exportable 
production.  Probably  it  is  most  important  in  the case of  thread  and 
yarn, both of  which have small ratios of  exports to total sales. 
There  are quantitative restrictions on  some imported  commodities. 
Imports of  some commodities for which it is believed there is sufficient 
domestic production are banned. Most items under control are subject 
to “approval” that, in practice, is usually not granted. However, these 
controls are not very pervasive. Often they are imposed on a short-run, 
ad hoc basis. In 1962 controls were imposed on sugar, old newspaper, 
paper  umbrellas, silk  textiles, tinfoil, paper  files, and  gold,  and  they 
are still in  effect. During  1966-69,  imports of  garlic,  glass  tumblers, 
truck and bus tires, cotton yarn, corn, sorghum, salt, canvas shoes, and 
swallows’ nests were controlled, but the control lasted only a short time. 
In 1970 and  1971 many items were  added to the list of  goods under 
control-iron  gas containers,  all  kinds of  paper,  fuel oil,  used  cars, 
white cement  and  clinker, used  motorcycles,  monosodium  glutamate, 
iron bars and rods, used trucks, and polyester fibers; these controls were 
in effect in 1973, the year on which this study focuses. 
Export controls are also applied ad hoc and are intended to assure 
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prices.  Commodities under  control  are mostly  NRB products  such as 
rice,  livestock,  sugar, maize,  and mineral  ores.  It was not until  1974 
that controls were placed on manufactured products such as gunnysacks, 
thread  and  yarn,  pig  iron,  detergent,  vegetable  oil,  polyester  fibers, 
monosodium glutamate, pulp and wood-free paper, insecticides, plastic 
granules,  and oils for mixing paint,  including thinners, most of  which 
had only  recently begun  to be exported.  The export of  most of  these 
items requires “approval,” which is usually granted. Quotas are applied 
in the case of  cattle and buffalo, cement, gunnysacks, maize, aluminum 
scrap, and pig iron. 
Given the objective of  promoting manufactured exports, export con- 
trol  is  seen  by  the government  as only  a  temporary  device to check 
domestic  prices  of  the  products  concerned  when  export  prices  are 
higher. By doing so, however, it automatically discourages production. 
There is  another  measure  the  government  has  used  to control  the 
export of  rice. Known  as the reserve requirement, it requires exporters 
to sell a certain amount of  rice to the government  at a nominal price 
when they export rice. This is in addition to the rice premium and the 
export duty on rice.  Since the price set by  the government  is usually 
much lower  than the f.0.b.  price, the measure  can be  regarded  as an 
additional export tax (Akrasanee and Wattananukit 1976). 
The Ministry  of  Industry can control industries in  many ways. It is 
empowered to permit or to ban new entries and the expansion of  existing 
firms and to establish conditions for new entry. The ban on entry and 
expansion is applied when the Ministry of  Industry thinks that domestic 
demand for a product can be satisfied by the existing firms or when the 
producers  are in difficulty and ask the ministry to prevent greater com- 
petition.  Before 1970 there was a ban on entry and expansion in milk 
products, plastic bags,  other plastic  products,  and ice factories.  Later, 
about ten other industries were added to the list. The controls are de- 
signed to be temporary, but in fact have usually remained in effect for as 
long as four or five years; exceptions were controls on chloric acid, tex- 
tile fabrics, nails, newsprint  and writing paper,  and fishing nets, which 
lasted for only one or two years. 
Conditions have been imposed on entry into some industries; namely, 
fertilizer, ceramics, glass products, motorcycle assembly, and car assem- 
bly.  Conditions  pertain  to  promotion,  equity  share,  type  of  product 
market,  size of  investment,  capacity, and so forth. Another control on 
industry is local content requirements; that is, some industries  are re- 
quired to obtain a certain percentage  of  inputs or specified parts from 
domestic  sources.  This  control  of  their  imports  has  been  applied  to 
milk products, steel wire, electric wire, motorcycles, and automobiles. 
The Ministry of  Industry is empowered to control even the types and 
quality  of  products  and the  time of  production.  For example, it  can 412  Narongchai Akrasanee 
regulate the models of  cars to be produced; it requires new glass-product 
firms  to produce  mostly bottles for medicine; it  stipulates that sugar 
mills are to produce 50 percent white sugar and 50 percent raw sugar; 
and it can decree the time the mills start producing each year. 
Summary 
Table 9.7 summarizes the incentives to import substitution and export 
industries in the early  1970s, as well  as the various agencies involved 
in their administration. In general, trade policy in this period favored 
import  substitutes  while  also  attempting  to  reduce  disincentives  for 
exports. The structure of  tariffs and  taxes favored import substitutes, 
while exports were  encouraged through the various concessions of  the 
promotion acts. A variety of  other controls existed. However, my assess- 
ment is that these other controls were quantitatively unimportant com- 
pared with the other aspects of  trade policy. 
9.2.2 
Data and Methodology 
I used production coefficients for 1971 obtained from the Manufactur- 
ing Survey of  that year  (National Statistical Office 1971) to calculate 
The Structure of  Protection in the Manufacturing Sector 
Table 9.7  Comparison of  Incentives for Import Substitution and for 
Exports, by  Government Agency, 1972-76 
Incentives 
Government Agency  Import Substitution  Exports 
Board of Znvestrnent  1.  Full exemption from im- 
port taxes and local taxes 
on machinery and equip- 
ment. 
2.  No exemption from taxes 
on imported or local raw 
materials, parts and com- 
ponents,  except  firms  in 
promoted  areas,  which 
received  up  to  50  per- 
cent deduction on import 
taxes. 
3. No exemption from busi- 
ness tax  on sales, except 
firms  in promoted  areas, 
which  received up to 90 
percent  deduction  for  5 
years. 
4.  Income  tax  holiday  for 
3-8  years. 
1. Full exemption from im- 
port  taxes  on machinery 
and equipment. 
Full exemption from 
taxes  on  imported  and 
local raw materials, parts, 
and  components. 
Full  exemption  from ex- 
port duty and business tax 
on exports,  for promoted 
exports. 
Income  tax  holiday  for 
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Table 9.7-continued 
Incentives 
Government Agency  Import Substitution 
5.  Other  nontax  incentives 
for promoted firms. 
6. Temporary  import  sur- 
charge  and  import  ban 
(not used  very much). 
Ministry of  Finance 
Customs Department 1.  Escalated tariff structure. 
2. Lower  business tax rates 
for  domestic  production 
than  for  imports  for 
some  products  (since 
1973). 
Fiscal Policy Office  - 
Ministry of Commerce  1. Import control for about 
Ministry of Industry 
Industrial Estate 
A uthoriry 
Bank of  Thailand 
40  manufactured  items 
(disaggregated  at  the 
seven-digit level) 
2.  Price  control  for  about 
20  manufactured  items 
(disincentives). 
1.  Control on entry, expan- 
sion,  and  local  contents 
for about 25 industries8 
2.  National  committees  to 
promote  basic  indus- 
tries.h 
1. One industrial estate. 
1. Rediscount  facility  at 
5%  interest rate for 180- 
day promissory notes  is- 
sued  by  commercial 
banks.c 
Exports 
5.  Other  nontax  incentives 
for promoted  firms. 
1.  Full  exemption from im- 
port taxes on  raw materi- 
als,  parts,  and  cornpo- 
nents. 
2.  Full  exemption  from  ex- 
port  and  business  taxes 
on some products. 
1. Tax refund  for the total 
amount  of  taxes  in  the 
cost of  production. 
1. Export control for  about 
20  manufactured  items 
(disincentives). 
2.  Export Service Center  (to 
provide miscellaneous ser- 
vice to exporters). 
1.  Export  processing  zone 
(to be built). 
1. Rediscount facility at 5% 
interest  rate  for  180-day 
promissory  notes  issued 
by commercial banks.c 
Source: Information from agencies indicated  in the table. 
Control on entry creates  incentives  for  existing  firms;  effect of  control on  ex- 
pansion  is  unclear; requirement  of  local contents creates disincentives. 
“Committees were mostly set up in 1974-76,  but only a few have been active. 
CCommercial banks charge 7  percent  interest on these notes. 414  Narongchai Akrasanee 
ERPs by  the Corden method.20 International  value added  (IVA) was 
calculated by deflating the value of  output and material inputs by appro- 
priate NRPs, taking into consideration tax rebates under the investment 
promotion scheme.21 Two different sets of  NRPs are given in the tables 
below. “Potential”  protection  refers to protection  implied by  the tariff 
and tax rates. “Realized” protection is derived from price comparisons 
and measures the actual protection  used by  domestic producers.22 The 
presentation of these two NRP estimates is interesting in its own right 
for, as we see, protection  actually  “realiZed” is typically less than that 
implied by the tariff and tax rates. 
Activities are classified into trade categories following the Ti  statistic 
method  outlined in chapter  1. Exportables  had a Td  statistic less than 
zero;  importables  had  Ti  statistics  between  zero  and 0.6 to  0.9. The 
variable value  to separate importable  from noncompetitive production 
was  due to the level of  aggregation in  each activity. The cutoff  point 
was 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, or 0.9 depending on whether the activity was classified 
at a two-, three-, four-, or five-digit SITC level. 
Importables were next  classified into protected and competitive  sub- 
groups, depending on whether their estimated ERPs were relatively high 
or low.  Exports  of  manufactures  were  further broken  down between 
those processing  NRB goods and those processing  other goods.  Note, 
however,  that  the latter distinction  is not without  problems.  Some of 
the products in the processed NRB group (e.g., cement) might have been 
excluded altogether as essentially natural resource based  (NRB) prod- 
ucts  rather  than  HOS  manufactures.  Others  in  the  group-especially 
shaved wood, wood products, and cordage and rope-might  have been 
assigned  to the non-NRB  manufactures  category  on the ground  that 
their inputs are internationally traded so that production is not bound to 
local availability of  materials. 
The Structure of Protection 
Nominal  rates  and  effective rates  as of  1973, both  potential  and 
realized in each case, are shown in tables 9.6 to 9.8, classified according 
to the trade orientation of  each industry. Table 9.9  summarizes ERPs 
by  trade category. For export industries, rates are shown separately for 
domestic and export sales. Primary interest focuses on the last column 
of table 9.6 and table 9.7 and the last two columns of  table 9.8 that show 
realized effective rates. 
For importables,  noncompeting  importables,  and domestic  sales  of 
exportables, the nominal potential  rates were  all positive  with  the ex- 
ception of  petroleum refining and tapioca flour, for which the rates were 
zero and minus 2 percent, respectively. Generally the potential nominal 
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For export sales of  export industries, nominal rates were zero, unless 
there was an export tax on the product, in which case the nominal rates 
were negative  (e.g., shaved wood and tapioca flour). Many of  the non- 
processed NRB export industries sold a large proportion of  their prod- 
ucts in the domestic market, where they were protected by generally very 
high  tariff  rates  (though,  as  noted  below,  realized  rates  were  usually 
much lower). 
From tables 9.6 to 9.8, we see that the difference between potential 
and realized nominal rates depends on the trade category of  the industry. 
In protected  importable  and  noncompeting importable  industries, the 
difference is usually not large. In fact, in most cases the rates are similar. 
Exceptions where the realized  rates  are lower include alcoholic bever- 
ages, sheet glass, sweetened condensed milk, pharmaceuticals, footwear, 
rubber products,  and radio, television,  and electrical household  appli- 
ances. In such cases, the lower realized rates indicate tariff redundancy 
caused by  number  of  firms  producing  a  growing  proportion  of  total 
domestic demand. Alternative explanations are preferences for imported 
products and price control. The factor of  preference is particularly true 
for radio, television, and electrical household appliances. In these cases 
imports sell at prices above those of  domestic production. Price control 
was imposed on condensed milk, and prices of  sheet glass were agreed 
upon  with  the  Board  of  Investment  as  a  condition  for  promotion 
privileges. 
For importable  industries that are competitive without needing pro- 
tection, and industries that are able to export but still rely largely on the 
domestic  market,  realized  nominal  rates  in  1973  (for the  latter,  of 
domestic sales)  were much lower  than  the potential  rates.  In fact, in 
most cases the rates were  zero, either because the difference in prices 
was negligible if  quality  differences are considered  or because the do- 
mestic and imported products  were different in nature. 
Effective rates of protection ranged from minus 42.6 percent for wood 
shavings  to  very  high  levels  for  alcoholic  beverages,  passenger  cars, 
sweetened condensed milk, cigars and cigarettes, and domestic sales of 
many  exportables. As expected, products  with  very high  potential  ef- 
fective protection belong to the importable group. 
For products  in  the exportable  group,  their  high  potential  effective 
rates  on domestic sales were the result  of  high tariff  rates  on imports 
of  like products.  But when  the products  were  exported,  the potential 
effective rates were zero in most cases because of  the tax refund and tax 
exemptions on their inputs.23 This was the case except for a few tradi- 
tional exports, such as tapioca flour and shaved wood, that were not en- 
titled to such benefits. 
When  realized  effective protection  is considered  for the importable 
category, the rates for some products were lower than potential  rates, Table 9.8  Nominal and Effective Rates of  Protection: Importable 
Industries, 1973 
Nominal Rates  Effective Rates 
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Table 9.Ccontinued 
Nominal Rates  Effective Rates 
Products  Potential  Realized  Potential  Realized 
Cereal preparations  60.7  0  1,044.0  -5.5 
Confectionery  81.1  0  -b  -13.3 
Soap, detergent  50.1  25.4  65.5  20.7 
Source: Tariff and taxes are from Customs Department; For the computation, see 
text. 
LLAlcoholic  beverages and cigars and cigarettes are included under  import-compet- 
ing because their  T statistics,  although very small, are positive. For both products 
the recorded value of  trade is small, but the availability of  foreign alcoholic bever- 
ages  in  Thailand  is  obvious.  It is  also  well  known  that  without  protection  do- 
mestic  alcoholic beverages  cannot compete with  foreign  ones.  Foreign  brands  of 
cigarettes are sold at prices competitive with local brands. 
bNegative value  added at world prices. 
but  products  classified  as  “protected”  remained  the  more  protected 
products. For this group the realized rates were close to, or the same as, 
the potential rates, implying that protection was fully utilized. This was 
also true for products in the noncompeting importable group. For these 
industries,  high realized effective rates mean that they were either mak- 
ing excessive profits  or were  very  inefficient. However,  there  was  no 
industry in this group with negative value added at world prices. On the 
whole, we  may say that substantial inefficiency or excessive profits are 
indicated in about fifteen or sixteen industries for which the calculation 
was made (i.e., those with realized effective rates exceeding 35 percent). 
These include beer,  whiskey, passenger  cars, buses and trucks,  cotton 
yarn  and  thread,  paper  products,  motorcycles,  pharmaceuticals,  foot- 
wear, textile articles, pottery, china, and earthenware, and four products 
for domestic sales in the group of  export industries-parquet  flooring, 
veneer  and plywood,  textiles  (noncotton), and leather products.  Most 
Table 9.9  Nominal and Effective Rates of  Protection: Noncompeting 
Importables, 1973 
Nominal Rates  Effective Rates 
Products  Potential  Realized  Potential  Realized 
Iron and steel  13.5  13.5  18.4  18.4 
Nonferrous metals  10.5  10.5  4.1  4.1 
Vehicle parts  38.4  38.4  68.7  68.7 
Nonelectrical machinery  15.9  15.9  4.2  4.2 
Sewing machines  20.0  n.a.  4.3  n.a. 
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Table 9.10  Nominal and Effective Rates of  Protection: Export Industries, 
1973 
Nominal Rates  Effective Ratesa 
Domestic Sales  Domestic Sales 
Export  Export 




Cement  17.5 
Concrete products  26.1 
Vegetable oils and 
fats  44.2 
Materials of rubber  33.0 
Sugar  115.5 
Tapioca flour  -2.0 
Wood products 
Parquet flooring  30.0 
Veneer and 
plywood  60.0 
Shaved wood  - 
Cordage and rope  27.7 
Non-primury-commodity bused 
Nonalcoholic beverages  69.6 
Monosodium 
glutamate  101.6 
Textiles, noncotton  44.2 
Cotton fabrics  41.5 
Printed matter  5.3 
Furniture  50.0 
Matches  66.0 
Clothing  54.3 




















0  10.6 
0  40.7 
0  274.7 
0  * 
0  * 
-2.0  -29.8 
0 
0 
0  26.3 
* 
* 
-18.7  - 
0  47.2 
0  537.5 
0  64.0 
0  59.4 
0  -13.2 
0  152.3 
0  23.3 
0  86.2 
0  48.6 
-  16.3  0 
n.a.  0 
n.a.  0 
-0.5  0 
2.9  0 
-29.8  -29.8 
68.90  0 
43.2  0 
-42.6  -42.6 
26.3  0 
-20.9  0 
-  17.5  0 
64.0  0 
7.6  0 
-20.3  0 
-2.1  0 
-9.5  0 
-7.1  0 
48.6  0 
Source: See table 9.8. 
aAn asterisk means negative value added at world prices. 
of  them are important industries in terms of  their output value,  as can 
be seen from table 9.6. 
In the  exportable  group,  except  for products  produced  specifically 
for exports, the realized  effective rates were calculated mostly for do- 
mestic sales, since these industries still sold a large part of  their products 
in the domestic market. As may be seen from table 9.10, and also for 
competitive industries in the importable group in table 9.8, the calculated 
realized effective rates were much lower than the potential rates. In fact, 
they  are mostly  negative.  The results  are  due  to the  relatively  low 
realized  nominal protection  together with the use of  import-competing 419  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
inputs, prices of  which were inflated by the extent of  tariff  and taxes.24 
But when the products were exported they were entitled to the tax re- 
fund and tax exemptions on their inputs. Thus the effective rates in the 
latter case are estimated to be zero. 
Table 9.11  gives  a  summary of  the structure of  protection  in  ex- 
istence in the early  1970s. The system provided  greatest  incentives to 
protected  importable  industries  and to domestic production  similar  to 
the noncompeting imports, whereas industries in the exportable  group 
were  clearly  discriminated  against,  having  low or negative  ERPs. In 
general, though, protection was relatively moderate in comparison with 
many other LDCs. 
9.3  Factor Proportions of  Trade and Domestic Production 
In this analysis I measure factor  proportions  by  labor requirements 
(in number  of  workers)  per  unit  of  value  added.  Two measures  are 
used-direct  labor requirements and direct plus indirect in home goods 
labor  requirement^.^^ Nonmaterial inputs, such as electricity and water, 
maintenance costs, and other services are treated  as home goods. Data 
on number  of  workers,  value  added  (net of  indirect  taxes),  and the 
value of  home goods used are from the Manufacturing Survey of  1973. 
Indirect labor and value added in home goods  are estimated from the 
NESDB 197  1 input-output table, the national income accounts statistics, 
and information from the electricity and water authorities.26 
The results  are presented  first for each activity  and then  according 
to the  trade  categories  defined  above  and  employed  in  tables  9.8 to 
9.1 1. I also  computed  labor  intensities  according to the direction of 
Table 9.1 1  Average  ERPs  by Trade  Category, 
1973 














26 (  0) 
35 
-18  (-18) 
Note: ERPs  are weighted by  DVA of  domestic pro- 
duction. 
BValues in parentheses refer to protection on export 
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trade. But since Thailand's  trade in manufactures is overwhelmingly with 
developed  countries,  the  labor  coefficients on  trade  with  LDCs  are 
ambiguous and thus are not reported here. 
9.3.1 
The direct  and  direct  plus  indirect  labor  requirements,  shown  in 
table 9.12, have a wide range of  values for direct requirements (col. 2). 
The ten least labor-intensive industries in 1973 were alcoholic beverages, 
cigars  and  cigarettes,  cement  and  concrete  products,  passenger  car 
assembly,  iron  and  steel, bus  and  truck  assembly,  electric  wires  and 
cables, rubber  tires  and tubes,  glass products,  and vegetable  oils and 
fats. The ten most labor-intensive were the pottery, china, and earthen- 
ware group, confectionery,  cordage and rope, textile articles, footwear, 
leather products,  clothing, cereal preparations,  nonelectrical machinery 
(small), and rubber products. 
The most  and the least labor-intensive  industries had labor require- 
ments differing by  a factor of  about  25; compare the direct labor re- 
quirement of  118.2 workers  (confectionery)  to 4.9 workers  (alcoholic 
beverages)  per  one million  baht of  value  added  in current  domestic 
prices. However, the majority of  industries clustered within the range of 
14 to 30 workers per one million baht of  value added. 
The variation in labor requirements among industries can also be seen 
from the direct plus  indirect  requirements  (col.  4), which  provide  a 
similar picture with some small changes in the ranking. This measure, 
which  indicates total  employment  effects,  indicates  that  the labor  in- 
tensity  of  the less labor-intensive  industries  is  sharply  increased when 
home goods are included, whereas that of  the more labor-intensive  in- 
dustries  shows  little change.  This change occurs because  home goods 
are relatively  labor-intensive,  though  not  as much  as  the most labor- 
intensive industries. When this indirect effect is taken into consideration, 
therefore, differences in labor coefficients among industries are reduced 
but still remain significant. 
9.3.2 
We next  calculated  weighted averages of  factor requirements for the 
exportable  and  importable  categories,  using  domestic  value  added  in 
production  as weights and subdividing exportables and importables as 
was done earlier (section 9.2).  These calculations are given in table 9.13. 
Including alcoholic beverages and cigars and cigarettes in the compu- 
tations  has a  significant effect upon  the results,  since they  have large 
weights in production  (see table 9.6) and value added. Treating them 
as home goods and excluding  them  completely would,  however,  be a 
questionable practice because imports compete with domestic products 
Factor Proportions of  Different Activities 
Factor Proportions by Commodity Category Table 9.12  Direct and Direct Plus Indirect in Home Goods Labor 
Requirements, by Industries According to Trade Categories, 
1973 (Number of  Workers per One Million Baht of  Domestic 
Value Added) 
Trade 
Categoriesa L/VAb  Rankc  L/VATb  Rankc 
Industry  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Alcoholic beverages 
Cigars and cigarettes 
Cement and concrete 
Passenger car assembly 
Iron and steel 
Bus and truck assembly 
Electric wires and cables 
Rubber tires and tubes 
Glass and glass products 
Vegetable oils and fats 
Nonalcoholic beverages 
Dairy products 
Textile yarn and thread 
Essential oils, perfume, 




Paper and paperboard 
Paper products 



















































Vehicle parts  NCI 
4.9  1 
5.3  2 
8.8  3 
9.5  4 
10.7  5 
11.5  6 
11.7  7 
13.8  8 
14.3  9 
14.3  10 
14.4  11 
14.8  12 
16.1  13 
16.2  14 
18.0  15 
18.1  16 
19.5  17 
20.0  18 
20.1  19 
21.6  20 
22.7  21 
23.4  22 
24.1  23 
24.5  24 
24.9  25 
25.2  26 
28.1  27 
25.5  28 
29.4  29 
30.1  30 
31.4  31 
33.2  32 
34.4  33 
34.6  34 










































































Categories L/VAb  Rankc  L/VATb  Ranke 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










Cordage and rope 
Pottery, china, and earthenware 
Confectionery 













31.4  36 
42.0  37 
45.5  38 
49.2  39 
61.8  40 
61.9  41 
72.3  42 
80.2  43 
84.4  44 
84.4  45 
86.5  46 
89.3  47 



























Source: Akrasanee  and Chintayarangsan  (1976). 
aICP =  import-competing,  protected;  ICC =  import-competing,  competitive;  EP 
=  exports,  primary-commodity  based  (PCB) ; ENP =  exports,  non-primary-com- 
modity based; NCI =  noncompeting imports. 
bL/VA =  workers  per  one million baht of  value added, direct;  L/VAT =  work- 
ers per one million baht of  value added, direct plus indirect of  home goods. 
‘Ranking  from the least labor-intensive industries. 
everywhere in the country,  even though  import  statistics  show a  rela- 
tively small value. I therefore computed Thai coefficients both including 
and excluding these products. 
Obviously, these results show that exportables are significantly more 
labor-using  than importables. This is true for direct labor requirements 
only and also for direct plus indirect requirements. Including indirect re- 
quirements in home goods results in only a slightly smaller difference be- 
tween the degrees of  labor intensity of  the two categories. According to 
the latter measure,  products  belonging  to the group of  exportable in- 
dustries are still about 50 percent more labor-intensive  than importable 
industries. 
With  regard to employment  implications, the most meaningful com- 
parison is between the coefficients for the “protected” importables  (col. 
5),  which indicate the employment effects of  import substitution,  and 
the coefficients for non-NRB  exportables  (col.  3), which  indicate the 
employment effect of  export expansion.  This comparison suggests that 
employment creation would be much greater through export expansion 
than  through import substitution for the same amount of  value added. 423  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
This conclusion is true whether we look at different labor requirements 
only  or at  direct plus  indirect requirements, and whether we  include 
or exclude  alcoholic beverages in  estimating requirements  for  “pro- 
tected”  importables.  Moreover,  the  conclusion would  be  unchanged, 
though  the margin  in  favor  of  exports would  be  slightly reduced,  if 
shaved wood, wood products, and cordage and rope were shifted to the 
non-NRB manufactures group in line with what was said earlier about 
the uncertainty attaching to the NRB classifications of  these products. 
With regard to noncompeting importables, given the limited size and 
the probable noncomparability of  imports and domestic production, the 
value added  and employment data entering into table 9.12 cannot be 
taken  as  relevant  for  imports.  I have  accordingly  not  attempted  to 
calculate labor coefficients for the noncompeting import sector. 
9.4  Factor Market Policies 
Besides the pattern of  protection, policies affecting factor prices also 
affect factor utilization and therefore may have significant employment 
 implication^.^^ My purpose in this section is to examine these potential 
effects in Thailand. 
Table 9.13  Labor Coefficients in Manufacturing Industries, Exports and 
Import-Competing Goods,  1973 (Number of Workers per One 
Million Baht of  Domestic Value Added-Weighted  Averages) 
Export Industries  Import-Competing Industriesa 
NRB  Non-NRB 
Manufac-  Manufac-  Compet- 
Measures of  Labor  Total  turing  turing  Total  Protected  itive 
Coefficients  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4 1  (5)  (6) 
Labor per direct 
value added  21.87  16.68  33.72  10.53  10.45  10.72 
(20.53)  (18.58)  (29.11) 
Direct plus indirect 
labor per direct plus 
indirect value 
addedh  29.55  25.37  36.28  19.21  21.43  15.21 
(29.51)  (27.84)  (35.35) 
Source:  Labor coefficients for each industry  are from table  9.9.  Domestic  value 
added weights are from Akrasanee and Chintayarangsan  (1976). For computation, 
see text. 
aFigures  in  parentheses  show  averages  excluding  alcoholic  beverages  (from the 
“protected”  group) and cigars  and cigarettes  (from the “competitive”  group). 
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9.4.1  Wage Differentials in Manufacturing 
Wage differentials may be caused by a variety of  economic and non- 
economic factors. In Thailand one might expect the labor market to be 
relatively  undistorted,  since minimum-wage  legislation  was  introduced 
only  in  1973 and  since the government  has not otherwise intervened 
heavily in wage determination. 
Data to adequately analyze wage differentials in Thailand are sparse. 
A limited amount of  information was available for twenty-seven indus- 
tries in 1973. I performed a variety of  exercises with these data (for de- 
tails, see Akrasanee and Chutikul 1977). First, average wages for skilled 
and  unskilled  labor were calculated for large  and  small firms. It was 
found that there was a large variation in the wages paid by industry and 
that larger firms tended to pay higher wages. Next, cross-sectional regres- 
sion analysis was carried out, regressing the average skilled and unskilled 
wage rates of  each industry on various independent variables such as firm 
sizes (AFS), the male/female  worker ratio (MF), profitability  (T),  for- 
eign share in ownership  (FS) ,  and unionization  (U)  . Both linear  and 
log-linear forms were tried. The results, shown in table 9.14, should be 
interpreted with caution, since no data on the skill characteristics of  the 
labor force were available. 
An important feature of  these results  is that a large portion of  the 
wage variation in 1973 could be explained by  a small number of  vari- 
ables. The most important were the male/female ratio, average firm size, 
and unionization; wages tended  to be higher  in  industries with higher 
ratios of  male-to-female workers, in industries composed of  larger firms, 
and in industries with higher levels of  unionization. 
To further investigate the significance of  the male/female  ratio, an- 
other regression analysis was made, this time for wages paid in firms of 
similar size, in order to exclude the influence of  the latter variable. The 
results  presented  in  table  9.15  show  clearly,  especially  for  unskilled 
workers, that firms of  a given size with more male workers tend to pay 
higher wages. 
One may  argue  that  wage  differentials  between  male  and  female 
workers could  be accounted for by  skill or physical differentials. That 
is, male workers may tend to have higher skills or be physically stronger. 
There may also be other reasons that women are less productive than 
men. If  that is the case, then  it cannot be said with certainty  that sex 
discrimination  causes  distortions  in  the  labor  market.  However,  the 
evidence suggests that the presence of  unions does tend to distort wages. 
The question of  sex discrimination cannot be answered  because of 
lack of  data on skill characteristics. While further research is warranted 
on this issue, I do feel at this time that only part of  male/female variable 
represents skill differences. This belief stems from the frequent observa- 425  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
tion  in Thailand that unskilled  female workers  are paid  less than un- 
skilled male workers for similar work to an extent that cannot be fully 
justified by skill differences. 
If,  for  whatever  reasons,  this  discrimination  exists,  then  there  are 
implications for employment creation. Female-dominated firms, paying 
lower wages, dominate the exportable category. For example, the male/ 
female ratio (MF) in spinning and weaving is 0.3, in knitting, 0.27, and 
in garments, 0.18. On the other hand, the male/female  ratio in major 
importable categories  is  very  high.  For example,  it  is  2.39 in rubber 
products, 6.76 in motor vehicles, and 2.08 in paper products. Thus, the 
import substitution bias of  the trade regime not only has encouraged the 
production of  relatively less labor-intensive industries, it possibly has also 
discriminated  against employment  creation for women. 
9.4.2 
Compared with the labor market,  there are many  more policy mea- 
sures and other forces that may  distort  the price of  capital.  We may 
divide  such  influences into three  groups : those  affecting tax liability, 
those affecting financial capital, and those directly affecting the price of 
physical capital. 
The differing income  tax  treatment  of  various  activities  under  the 
various promotion  acts  distorts the price  of  capital to the extent that 
the tax is borne by capital. Tax holidays lower the average tax rate over 
the life of  the investment, thus lowering the price of  capital to promoted 
firms. The textile industry has been the most important recipient of  pro- 
motion  privileges.  Other  industries  taking  considerable  advantage  of 
these  privileges in the  early  1970s were chemical  products,  iron  and 
steel, motor vehicles, thread and yarn, metal products, rubber tires and 
tubes,  and  household  electrical  goods  and  appliances.  The extent  to 
which promotion  is selective may have resulted in differential cost ad- 
vantages to these industries. 
Besides tax holidays, promoted  firms do receive a clear-cut  subsidy 
through  duty-free  import  of  capital  goods,  thus  reducing the original 
cost of  capital goods. In general, duties on capital goods have been much 
lower than those imposed on consumer goods and intermediate imports 
at higher  levels of  fabrication. Therefore, in relative  terms, tariff  rates 
increase the price of  capital goods less than that of other goods. On the 
other hand, I believe that the currency was mildly overvalued in  1973 
(see discussion in section 9.1 ) . If  this is true, the price of  capital goods 
would  have  been  lower  because  of  this  overvaluation,  and  capital- 
intensive industries would have been generally favored. 
Finally, there is really no effective subsidization of  financial capital in 
Thailand  except  the rediscount  facility  at the Bank  of  Thailand. The 
most  important sources of  financial capital  are the  commercial banks. 
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Table 9.14  Determination of  Wages of  Unskilled and Skilled Workers: 
Regression Resnlts, 1973 
Form 
Depen-  of  Market  Foreign  Wage  Profit- 
dent  Equa-  Inter-  Power  Share  Share  ability 
Variable tion  cept  (MP)  (FS)  iWS)  (?.I 
linear  1770.3 
linear  12074.1 
linear  427 1.1 
hear  4638.1 
linear  14298.0 
log-  4.192 
linear 
log-  6.066 
linear 
log-  8.187 
linear 
1%-  8.130 
linear 
log-  8.862 
linear 
-68.598  2.397  249.713 
(- 1.33)  (.079)  (2.792)* 
-161.312  15.317  228.721 
(-1.713)***  (.276)  (1.397) 
-  .293  .028  .209 
--.318  .061  .046 
( -  1.603)  (.735)  (1.731)*** 
















( -  .647) 
(--.281) 
( -  2.677) *  * 
(-2.014)  * * * 
(-1.098) 
~~  - 
Source: Akrasanee  and Chutikul  (1977). 
Note:  W,  =  unskilled wages; W8  =  skilled wages; MP =  the share of  gross output 
originating from the largest producer  in  the industry; FS =  percentage of  the in- 
dustry  equity  contributed  by  nonresidents;  WS =  wage  share  in  total  cost; 
x =  profit  per employee;  VA =  value added per employee; LT =  number of  em- 
ployees who left employment in percentage of  total employees; AFS =  average sale 
volume;  MF =  ratio  of  male  to  female unskilled  workers;  NLVA =  nonwage 
value  added  per  employee;  U =  percentage  of  total  employees  that  are union 
members. 
*p <  .01. 
**p <  .05. 
***p <.lo. 
The interest rates charged vary from about 10.5 percent for “big regular 
customers” to about 14 percent for small-scale firms. No clear differen- 
tial exists along industry lines; differential access to finance most likely 
exists  between  firms of  different  sizes, although  quantitative  evidence 
cannot  be  presented  because there  are problems  of  disclosure.  Small 
firms  whose  credit-worthiness  is  in  question  resort  either  to  finance 
companies or to  sources  outside the organized  sector, both  of  which 
usually charge considerably higher rates. 427  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
Average 
Firm  Male-  Capital 
Produc-  Labor  Size  Female  Inten-  Union- 
tivity  Turnover  (AFS, or  Ratio  sity  ization 
WA)  (LT)  AFS2)  (MF)  (NLV-4)  (U)  R2 
.046 
(1.285) 




































212.54  .067 
208.893  .007 
389.343  .001 
(4.480) * 
(5.136) * 
(4.918)*  (1.251) 
(4.285)*  (.132) 





.301  .088 
(5.697)*  (.866) 
.316  .004 
.269  .065 
(5.062)*  (--.032) 



















All the forces described above indicate that the price of  capital tends 
to be lower than the “market equilibrium” price,  although I have not 
found it possible to measure the difference. But, if  this distortion exists, 
it is probably not very large, for funds are allowed to move rather freely 
in  and  out of  the country,  and trade is not restricted, as I  explained 
earlier. My assessment is therefore that small firms pay the scarcity price 
of  capital, whereas larger firms and promoted firms pay somewhat lower 
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Table 9.15  Regression Results of  Wage Determination by Firm Size, 1973 
Male  Nonwage Value 
Dependent  Female  Added (per 





























































Source: Akrasanee and Chutikul (1977). 
Note:  Wis, Wit,:  average  wage  by  industry  for  skilled  and unskilled  workers  re- 
spectively in firms size  i, where  i is in terms of  number of  employees as follows: 
i = 1:  10 employees  and  less;  i  2:  11-19  employees;  i  3: 20-49 employees. 
"p <  .01. 
**p <  .05. 
***p <  .lo. 
9.4.3  Factor Prices, Labor Intensities, and Effective Protection 
From the analysis above, we  can tentatively conclude that there is a 
small degree of  distortion in both labor and capital markets. In general, 
larger,  male-intensive  firms  tend  to  pay  higher  wages  than  smaller, 
female-dominated  firms. Benefits due to various capital market  distor- 
tions  have  accrued  to  larger promoted  firms. Thus the rental  rate of 
capital probably is lower for these activities than for small-scale indus- 
tries. Both sets of  distortions seem to favor capital utilization  in larger, 
male-dominated,  and  promoted  firms, most  of  which produce  import- 
ables. On the other hand,  smaller, female-dominated,  exportable firms 
probably  tend to minimize the use of  capital and use even more labor 
than if labor markets were not distorted. 
One would  also expect a positive relationship between levels of  pro- 
tection  and capital utilization. As a crude test of  this hypothesis,  I re- 429  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
gressed value added per employee, both direct and total  (as a measure 
of  capital  intensity)  upon the rate of  effective protection. The results, 
given below,  indicate that  this relationship  exists for the direct value 
added equation but not when home goods are included. Therefore, on 
the whole, the results suggest, at least weakly, that trade policy is biased 
toward capital-intensive  industries and to that extent has hindered em- 
ployment creation in Thailand. 
(1)  VA/L  =  39.81 -+ 2.182ERP  R2 =  .136 
(.112)  t  =  2.41, 
(2)  VAT/L  =  30.26 +-  .06782ERP  R2 =  .059 
(.0453)  t =  1.50. 
To summarize,  my  analysis  tends to support the notion  that factor 
market distortions are antiemployment for large-scale, capital-intensive, 
male-intensive  industries  and proemployment  for small-scale,  female- 
intensive industries. Second, the trade regime has a tendency to be anti- 
employment, since the ERP  varies  directly with  the value  added  per 
worker ratio.  Probably  the latter  effect  is more important than factor 
market distortion. 
9.5  Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the effects of  trade policies on em- 
ployment  in Thailand may be summed up as follows: First, the policy 
of  promoting manufactured exports, especially exports that are non-NRB 
related, is generally favorable to employment.  Second, the employment 
pattern  of  production  and  trade  is  consistent  with  the known  factor 
endowment. Third, there is  a positive,  though not strong, relationship 
between the degree of  capital intensity of  production  and effective rates 
of  protection. Protection tends to protect importables with higher capital 
intensity, whereas labor-intensive  exportables receive lower or negative 
protection. 
Since the strategy of  export promotion  has  been  found to  be more 
employment-creating,  the continued practice of  import substitution has 
meant that employment is being created at higher cost, ceteris paribus, 
and that more employment could have been generated with an export 
oriented  strategy.  However,  the  bias  in  the incentive  system  has not 
been strong enough to reverse the pattern of  factor intensity of  produc- 
tion and trade from that predicted on the basis of  factor endowments. 
Two areas of  policy implications regarding trade strategy for employ- 
ment growth may  be  distinguished:  the overall trade strategy  and the 
incentives policy. If  employment creation is one of  the major develop- 
ment objectives, then the strategy of  export promotion would create em- 430  Narongchai Akrasanee 
ployment at lower cost. An export promotion strategy also means that 
less protection  would be given to importable  production.  These goods 
would have to be more competitive and, as I have shown, “competitive” 
importables are more labor-intensive than “protected” importables; they 
also would create more employment than a policy of  continued adher- 
ence to protecting capital-intensive  importables. 
Factor market policies aimed at employment promotion should seek to 
reduce wage/rental  ratios facing capital-intensive, large-scale industries. 
This could be done by eliminating duty-free imports of  capital, eliminat- 
ing tax holidays,  and subsidizing wages. This, in effect, would mean  a 
change in the promotional  activities of  the Board  of  Investment.  For 
labor-intensive industries, especially small-scale industries and firms, the 
wage/rental  ratios facing them  are already  proemployment. But  these 
ratios have been found to be too low in the sense that small entrepre- 
neurs  tend to pay  lower wages, while they  themselves are exposed  to 
high capital charges (Sa-nguanruang and Tamboonlertchai 1976). If  this 
is the case, higher mobility in the labor and capital markets would raise 
the wage rate of  these workers and lower the price of  capital for small- 
scale  industries.  Such changes  might  reduce  employment  per  firm but 
increase the number of  viable firms more than enough  to compensate 
the lower labor intensity effect. 
Trade policies have to be directed toward encouraging labor-intensive 
activities. This could be done by  eliminating  high  protection  afforded 
“protected” importables and by  setting protection  at uniform rates for 
all activities. Furthermore, exports might be directly encouraged through 
subsidization, or at least the elimination of  controls on prices and pro- 
duction.  The net  result  of  these  policies would  be an increase in the 
employment generation capabilities of  Thailand’s manufacturing sector. 
This result is vital,  given the increasingly  difficult problems of  finding 
employment for its rapidly growing urban labor force. 
Notes 
1. See Ingram  (1971)  and  Sondysuvan (1975)  for more  detailed descriptions 
of  Thailand‘s economic development. 
2.  SITC refers to  Standard  International Trade  Classification, and  ISIC refers 
to International Standard Industrial Classification. 
3. The ISIC treats processed food, beverages and tobacco as manufactures; the 
SITC does not. 
4. The  remaining  imports  are  classified  as  “other,” which  in  fact  is  a  very 
important group because it includes major items such as passenger cars, buses and 
trucks, and  crude oil. 
5. This  section  and  the  more  detailed  discussion  in  section  9.2 are  adapted 
from Akrasanee (1977). 431  Trade Strategy for Employment Growth in Thailand 
6.  The name was later changed  to National Economic and Social Development 
Board. 
7. See Akrasanee (1973) for a discussion of that period. The system of  taxation 
in  use in  the  1970s, which  is basically  similar  to that of  the  1960% is discussed 
in section 9.2. 
8.  Tariff rates were increased both to provide additional protection and for reve- 
nue and balance of payments reasons; see Akrasanee  (1975). 
9. National Executive Council  Decrees nos. 227 and 329, Bangkok,  1972. 
10. After  March  1978, the value of the baht was linked to a basket  of  curren- 
cies replacing  the earlier  fixed parity  with the United States dollar. 
11. The  rice  premium,  an  export surcharge  on  rice,  is  used  to  stabilize  the 
domestic  price  of  rice.  Therefore the premium  rate is  adjusted  according  to the 
changing  world  price  of  rice.  For  the  most  comprehensive  history  of  the  rice 
premium,  see  Siamwalla  (1975). The sugar  export  surcharge  was  introduced  in 
1974, when the world price of sugar was very high, to tax the profits of  exporters. 
The rates  are based  on a  sliding  scale  with  a  minimum  level  below  which  the 
rate  is zero.  In  1977,  when  the world  price  of  sugar became very  low, the sur- 
charge was therefore zero. 
12.  The  term  “subsidize”  here  means  only  the  tax-refund  or  tax-exemption 
measures of  the ministry. 
13. The  ministry  maintains  an ad  hoc  list  of  goods under  export  and  import 
controls,  and the list  is  changed  from time  to time.  In  1973  the  import control 
list  and export  control list  included  thirty-five  and seventeen  items,  respectively. 
In most cases the control is for the purpose of inspecting the goods. See discussion 
below for details on these controls. 
14. Usually  changes in tariff  rates are made  for a  few items each year.  These 
changes are announced by  the Ministry of Finance and are published  in the Bank 
of  Thailand Monthly Bulletin. 
15.  Another  interpretation  is  that  the  balance  of  payments  deficit  was  used 
as  a  pretext  for  tariff  adjustments  that  were  demanded  by  domestic  producers 
before  the deficit. 
16.  Most  exports  are  exempt  from the  business  tax.  For  more  detail  on  the 
computation of  taxes, see Akrasanee  (1973). 
17.  For example, to request  tariff protection  from the Ministry  of  Finance, to 
request  restriction  on entry of  new firms  from the  Ministry  of  Industry,  and  SO 
forth. 
18. National Executive Council Decree no. 227, Bangkok,  1972. 
19. Information from the Ministry  of  Commerce. 
20.  The  1973  coefficients became  available  later, but  I did  not recalculate the 
ERPs. 
21. The general formula for the calculation of  ERP is given in the introductory 
chapter. The formula used in this study is from Akrasanee  (1973). 
22. See Balassa et al. (1971) for more discussion of  potential and realized pro- 
tection.  See also Akrasanee  (1973) for more detail  on the method of  calculation 
for Thailand. 
23. With  tax  exemption and tax  refund, output and inputs  are valued  at their 
border  prices,  resulting  in  domestic  value  added  in  the  industry  approximately 
equaling the  IVA. Note  also that  in  export  industries,  assuming  that producers 
entitled  to  tax  exemption  and  tax  refund  in  their  export  sales  claim  their 
privileges, potential rates and realized  rates are equal. 
24.  This was also  true for promoted  firms, because they  were  entitled  to only 
one-third of  rebates. 432  Narongchai Akrasanee 
25. These requirements  were  also calculated per  unit of  nonwage  value added. 
But since the results lead to the same conclusion, they are not reported here. 
26.  The  1971  1-0 table  of  the  National  Economic  and  Social  Development 
Board  (NESDB)  is  still  in  preliminary  stage.  I have  therefore not  used  it for 
other calculations  in  this  study. The national income account  statistics  are from 
the NESDB.  The electricity  and water  supply  authorities  are the Electricity Gen- 
erating Authority of  Thailand,  the  Metropolitan  Electricity  Authority, the  Pro- 
vincial  Electricity Authority,  and the Metropolitan  Water  Supply Authority.  For 
more  detail on the data used, see Akrasanee and Chintayarangsan  (1976). 
27.  See  Krueger  (1977a,  b) and  the  introductory  chapter  for details  on this 
argument. 
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